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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE 0'F UTAH 
'flllOKOL Clll·:~IICAL CORPORA-
Tit)~. a Corporation, 
Pla·intiff-U('.-.;!)()IIrlcnf anrl Cross-
.11' 1wl!au I. 
and 
r~lTI•:D ~T.\TE~ OF Al\fERICA, 
Plamt,iff-1 nterrfnor and Cross-
.·lpfJcl!anf 
-v~.-
LE 0 R .\X DE PETERSON, 
Defendant -Appellant 
I \ Case No. 9912 
BRIEF o~F INTERVENO~R 
~TATEJIEXT OF XATFRE OF THE CASE 
Thi~ ca~e involve:' the applicability and constitution-
ality of the l ~tab privilege tax, Sec-bon 59-13-73 of the 
rtah Code .. :\nnntnt(•(l, 1953, amended (Appendix, infra)/ 
H:' applied to property owned by the United States of 
:\.merira and used by Thiokol Chemical Corporation in 
the p~rformance ,of a Government research and develop-
ment rontract. 
1. The Ctah Code Annotated is hereafter cited as U.C.A. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COrRrl1 
This suit was commenced by Thiokol Chemical Cor-
poration (hereafter called Thiokol) for the refund of 
$125,801.29 in taxes paid under protest to Le Grande 
Peterson, treasurer of Box Elder County. (R. 204-206.) 
The United States is entitled to the full amount of any 
refund (R. 249) and was accordingly granted leave to 
intervene as a party pl,aintiff (R. 215). By their com-
plaints, 'Thiokol and the United States sought a declara-
tion that Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., was unconstitutional 
and a refund of the tax paid under that section on the 
grounds that ( 1) the incidence of the tax was on the 
United States; (2) Thoikol made no taxable use of and 
had no taxable interest in the property assessed; (3) 
the tax imposed by Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., when com-
pared with the tax imposed on state-owned property 
taxed under Section 59-2-2, U.C.A., discriminated against 
the United States and those with whom it dealt; (4) Sec-
tron 59-13-73, U.C.A., was applied in such a manner as to 
discriminate against the United States and those with 
whom it dealt. (R. 204-206, 216-218.) Trial was had 
before the Honora:ble Lewis Jones, sitting without a 
jury, in the First Judicial D~istrict Court, Box Elder 
County, State of Utah. On April12, 1963, the court filed 
i~ts findings of fact and conclusions of law awarding 
judgment to Thiokol and the United States on the ground 
that the statute was applied in such a manner as to dis-
criminate against the United States and those with whom 
it dealt. (R. 245-253.) However, the court ruled against 
the other points urged by Throikol and the United States. 
The defendant, Le Grande Peterson, appealed from this 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
judgnwnt nml ~'hiokol and the r nited States cross-
nppt.>alt'(l from the court's failure to grant the prayed 
t'111' dt>('lar·atory relief. (R. 255, 259.) 
RELIEF HOFGHT ON APPEAL 
1'1w F nitPd ::-;t:ates, as cross-appellant, seeks a de-
(•lnrntion that Section 59-13-73, P.C.A., is unconstitution-
al in that (1) it purports to tax users of federally-owned 
property on the full value of such property, whereas coin-
pnrahlP n~Pr~ of state-owned property are tre,ated dif-
t't>rently undt>r SPction 59-2-2, U.C.A., and (2) Thiokol 
do~~ not havP a taxable interest in the property. ·The 
Fnited ~tates, as respondent, urges the affirmance of 
the trial court·~ ruling that Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., was 
applied in a manner that discriminated against the 
tTnitl'd ~tates and those with whom it dealt.2 
ST..:\ TEThiENT OF FACT1S 
Tht> plaintiff, Thiokol Chemical Corporation (he,re-
after ealled Thiokol), is a Delaware corporation that is 
qualified to do business in the State of Utah and was in 
t'aet doing business within the state during the year 
1961. (H. ~45-~46.) Since 1957, a portion of Thiokol's 
hu~iness has involved research and development on the 
fir:-;t stage of the .Jiinuteman l\Iissile under a contract 
entered into with the United States. (Ex. 6.) During 
2. Although the United States has not argued in this brief 
that the e.."{emption of charitable and religious organizations in 
Section 59-13-73, U.C.A. renders that section unconstitutional, the 
United States does not waive this point but refers to the argu-
ment as made in the brief submitted by Thiokol. 
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1961, the taxable year in question, this research was con-
ducted at Thiokol's Was·atch Division which i~ located 
in Box Elder Oounty, Utah. (R. 68, 246.) 
The contract between Thiokol and the United States 
1s of the cost-plus-fixed-fee type and under its tenus 
Thiokol's compensation is based on a percentage of the 
original estimate of the total cost of performance. (R. 
77, 246.) Under this type of contract any subsequent 
cost saving will not reduce the compensation and any 
increase in costs ov·er and above the original estimates 
will not increase Thloikol's fee unless the increase is at-
tributable to changes in the work or services to be per-
form·ed. The fee is thus completely fixed at the outset 
of the contract and the efficiency or inefficiency which 
Thiokol demonstrates in the use of the equipment fur-
nished by the Government will not affect its profit. 
(R. 77-78, 84.) 
Thiokol is not free to decide for itself how to proceed 
with the reseach and must obtain approval from the Air 
Frorce Ballistic Systems Division (a division of the 
United States Air Force) prior to embarking on -any 
project. The United States maintains a staff of appro!Xi-
Inately sixty people at the Wasatch Division and United 
States approval is required 'Of such items as: security 
policies, s.afety measures, labor relations, accounting, 
procurement, and the company's organizational struc--
ture including wages and salaries. (R. 69-75.) The re-
search and development activities ~of Thiokol relate to the 
first stage of the missile only, stages two .and three being 
the responsibility of other contractors and final a:ssembly 
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occur~ at Boeing Plant 77, Hill ..:\ir Force Basr. (R. 131-
1~,~.) r;IP pfforts ol' all tlll'~l' contractors are coordinated 
hy the Balli~tie~ ~y~tt:>ms Divi~ion which has technical 
1'1':-'pon~ihilit,'> for ~PPing- that the total missile is opera-
itonnl. ( 1\. l ;, 1.) 
ln <H'<'ordance with the terms of the contract, the 
rnitt•d ~tate~ provided Thiokol "·ith machinery, equip-
uwnt arHl other personal property to be used in the 
pt•rl'onnarH'l' of the contract. (R. 246; Exs. 1, 6.) This 
propt~rty wa~ furnished without charge, and the con-
trad ~I>P<'i fieally provided that title to such property was 
to remain in the United States. (Ex. 6.) The United 
~tatl'~ reserved the right to divert any of the equipment 
furni~lu•d to other uses at other locations (R. 72), al-
though thi~ right was not exercised in 1961 (R. 73). 
During the tax y<:>ar in question all of the property fur-
ni~lH•d by the l~nited States was used by Thiokol solely 
in the performance of the contract. (R. 246.) 
In the year 1961, an assessment in the aggregate 
amount of $2+!,958.80 was made agaill'st Thiokol with 
n·~tH'l't to certain properties located in Box Elder Cotm-
ty. and of this anwunt $125,801.29 was assessed against 
1 )roperty title to which remained in the United States. 
(Ex. 1.) On X oveinber 29,1961, Thiokol paid the total 
n$~t·~~ment and protested that portion of the assessment 
attributable to the property O"\\'Jled by the United States. 
Thi::-: acti<m for the recovery of the protested tax was 
then in::-:titnted against the defendant, Le Grande Peter-
~nn. treasurer of Box Elder County, Utah. (R. 204-206, 
Ex. 1.) ~inee any recovery in tllis suit would inure to 
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the benefit of the United States, the United States moved 
to file a complaint in intervention and was granted leave 
to intervene on August 28, 1962. (R. 215.) The complaints 
of both Thioikol and the United States called into ques-
tion the constitutionality of Section 59-13-73 and the At-
torney General of U t.ah was notified of the proceeding 
in accordanoe with Section '78-33-11, U.C.A. 'l'he Attor-
ney General thereafter appeared and participated 
throughout the proceeding. (R. 209-210.) 
The case came to trial before the Honorable Lewis 
Jones, District Judge, sitting in the District Court of 
Box Elder County, Utah, and culminated in an award of 
judgment for the United States and Thiokol on April12, 
1963. (R. 252-253.) This judgment was predicated on 
the trial court's conclusion that the United States had 
proved ( R. 249) -
That defendant and other responsible taxing 
officials of the State of Utah and Box Elder 
County, in assessing and levying taxes for the 
year 1961, discriminated against plaintiff, Thio-
kol Chemical Corp., and United States of Ameri-
ca, intervenor, in the manner in which they con-
strued, applied and enforced Section 59-13-73 of 
the Utaih Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The evidence adduced at the trial bearing on this 
finding can be divided into two distinct categories. First, 
the evidence bearing on the practices and policies of the 
taxing officials of Box Elder County in administering 
Sections 59-2-2 and 59-13-73, U.C.A.; and, second, the 
evidence illustrating the administration of these sections 
on a state-wide basis. 
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The administration of Section 59-13-73 U.C.A. 
by the taxing officials of Box Elder County . 
. \ t the trial it wa~ proved that there were numerous 
parreb of property that were leased or sold by the State 
und local officials of Box Elder County which were sub-
jPI't to tlw ta..x. impmwd by Section 59-13-73 but were not 
taxed pur~nant to that ~Pction. These included several 
pa t'<•Pl~ of real estate referred to as the "Brigham City 
l'ropt-rtiP~" which wPre all leased or sold under contract 
by the eity. Tlwy consist of lots 1, 15 and 16 of block 
ti, Brigham City five-aerP plot in the N.W. 14 of section 
1-l. 1.\ 9 and N. R. 2. W.S.L.M., known as the "Septic 
Plant ~itt>" and approximately 16.75 acres in the S. Y2 
of K\V. ~~of 'section 18. T. 9. N. R. 2. W.S.LM, known 
a~ the "Gravel Pit Site"; and approximately 19.51 acres 
owned by the Board of Education of the Box Elder 
County School Distrid, an instrumentality of the County. 
( R. :!-+7.) Although the court found (R. 247) that at least 
part of eac.h 'of these properties were in the possession 
of. and u~ed by, private individuals, associations, or 
rorporations in connection with business conducted for a 
profit, it was stipulated between the parties to this suit 
that these properties were not taxed under Section 59-13-
7:~ r.r.A., or any other provision of the Utah law (Ex. 
1). 
In addition, the parties stipulated that there were 
upwards of 380 parcels of land in the State of Utah, title 
to which remains in the State of Utah and which were 
held by contract vendees under contracts of sale from the 
state. (Ex. 1.) Pursuant to the provisions of Sections 
59-5-;)0 and 59-5-51. U.C.A., the State Land Board an-
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nually prepared a list of these properties and forwarded 
the list 1:o the State Tax Cmnmission which in turn sent 
it to the local ass·essors. (R. 2-tG-2-1-7; Ex. 3.) The list 
sent to the taxing officials of Box Elder Oounty for the 
year 1961 contained 34 properties that were located with-
in the limits of the County. The trial court found that 
at least 27 of thHse properties were· used in a business 
for profit and were in all other respects subject to the 
provisions of Section 59-13-73, lT.C.A., but were not 
taxed pursuant to that section. (R. 247-248.) To the ex-
tent that these properties were taxed at all, it was pur-
suant to Section 59-2-2, U.C.A., which taxes purchasers 
of state lands on their equity interest only. (Ex. 1.) 
Fred L. Peterson, County Assessor for Box Elder 
County, was called on to explain his failure t'O assess any 
of these propertie'S under Section 59'-13-73, U.G.A. As 
to the "Brigham City Properties" he testified on direct 
examination (R. 159-160) : 
Q * * * Did you, in making your a:ssessment 
for the year 1961, conduct any investigation as to 
the properties owned by the· Board of Education 
of Box Elder County, by the City of Brigham, or 
any other municipalities of Box Elder County, 
which were then under lease to private parties 
and us-ed by those private parties in connection 
with their businesses condueted for a profit~ 
A No, sir. 
Q You n1ade no such inves,tigation prior to 
making the assessments for the year 1961 ~ 
A After it appeared in the name of the city 
or the county it went off the tax rolls. 
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Q Ami :·ou didn't stop to consider that per-
hap;-; that was leased to a private owner who wa~ 
u~in.!.!." it in connection with a business? 
.:\ I did not. 
It i~ true that as to one parcel of property, the 
"t:ra\·,·1 Pit ~itp,'' Jlr. Pet(·r~on had directed an inquiry 
to the rtah ~tatP Tax Cominission and had be·en in-
t'nnned that thP propert:· should be taxed under Section 
;J!)-13-7:l, P.C .. :\. (R. 180; Ex. 9.) Nevertheless, this pro-
pt•rty wa:-: not taxed, t'he failure to tax being explained 
n:-: nn m·pr~ight.3 
Jf r. P~·terson was also specifically examined with 
rt't'PrPn<'P to the 3-l properties purchased from the State 
h~· private individuals under a contract which provided 
that title \nl~ to rPmain in the state. He stated that 
:-;nch properties Wt're taxed on the purchasers' equity 
intPn':-;t only ann that no investigation had been made 
tn determine ,,·hether any of the purchasers used the 
property in connection with a business conducted for a 
profit. ( R. 1 :JI -138.) 
Xo PYidence was produced at the trial that Fred L. 
Peterson, County Assessor for Box Elder County, had 
H:':'t':'~ed any property within that County under S.eetion 
;~~L 1:~- ~~~. l ~.l'.A., with the single exception of the property 
ownPd by the Fnited States and used by Thiokol. 
3. It is only in connection with this failure to tax the 
gravel pit site that Mr. Peterson testified there was an oversight. 
~ppellant's suggestion that the failure to tax all of these proper-
ties was due to an oversight is not supported by this testimony. 
(Br. 9: R. 179-180.) 
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The discriminatory application of Section 59-13-
73, U.C.A., on a state-wide basis. 
The evidence introduced at the trial concerning the 
State-wide failure to apply Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., to 
many properties that were properly subject to its terms 
was voluminous. The series of special use leases were 
introduced and the eourt found (R. 247) that nine of 
these leases (Exs. 1-c, 1-h, 1-i, 1-j, 1-o, 1-q, 1-r, 1-u, and 
1-v; (R. 247) wer:e for lands leased to private individuals 
or corporations in business for a profit. Of these special 
use le·ases in evidence, only five were taxed under Sec-
tion 59-13-73, U.C.A. (Exs. 1-c, 1-q, 1-r, 1-u, and 1-v; R. 
247-248.) The leases that were taxed appeared t'O be all 
owned by utilitie~s subject to the taxing jurisdiction of 
the State Tax Commission itself rather than the County 
assessors. (R. 97-98, 138.) 
In addition to the special use leases, evidencH was 
also presented to indicate that there were upwards of 
380 parcels of land which on January 1, 1961, were in 
the, pos~session of private individuals under a contract of 
sale from the State. The trial court found that approxi-
mately 200 of these properties were in the hands of 
private individuals using the property in connection 
wi,th .a business for a profi,t, but were not taxed under 
Secti~on 59-13-73, U.C.A. (R. 277.) To the extent that 
users of these properties were taxed they were taxed 
under Section 59-2-2, U.G . .A., on their equities only. 
(Ex. 1.) 
In relation to lands sold by the State, the State Tax 
Commission is required to certify to the l'ocal assessors 
10 
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the equity value of property sold by the State so that 
the tax may be impoi5Pd pursuant to Section 59-2-2, 
r.C .. \. (~P<'iions 59-5-50 and 59-5-51 of U.C.A.) Mr. 
~lax I I. K('tT, Director of Property Tax for the Utah 
~tab· Tax ( iommis:-;ion, was asked on cross-examination 
W'hPthPr any consideration was given to a change in this 
prad i<'P after the passa;ge of Section 59-13-73, U.C.A. 
He replied, "So far as I know the only thing ·that has 
ha.ppem•d sin<'<' the imposition of this law in regard to 
state lnnd equities has been the same as before. We have 
hePn certifying them to the County Assessors in accord-
mwe with the law that n~quires us to." (R. 107.) He 
was furtlwr examined relative to the Commission's ac-
tivities with relation to Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., and 
h'~tit'it>d as follows (R. 107-108): 
Q Have any new instructions been issued 
by t lw State Tax Commission~ 
A "\Vi t h regard to this ~ 
Q Yes. 
A Not to my knowledge. 
Q Does the State ·Tax Commission have the 
authority to direct County As'sessors to assess 
property which they have ovedooked when it 
comes to the attention of the State Tax Commis-
sion that the properties have been omitted from 
the tax rolls? 
A It is my understanding that the Tax Com-
mission has the authority, after the Board of 
Equalization has met, to review the work of the 
County Assessors and to assess in its own name 
this property. 
Q Any property that was omitted~ 
A Yes. 
11 
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Q Has the State Tax Commission, in the 
exercise of that authority, ever made any assess-
ments under section 59-13-73 for the year 1961? 
A Not to my knowledge. 
The only effort made by the State Tax Commission 
to advise county assessors as to the enforcement of 
Section 59-13-73 oecurred at the annual assessor's school 
conducted on December 10 and 11, 1959. 'The major part 
of the discussion that occurred at the assessor's school 
involved a legal analysis of the recent Michigan cases 
and an opinion as to the constitutionality of taxing us~ers 
of Federal Government property. The only indication 
that property other than that belonging to the United 
States was also included within the ambit of the tax 
occurs in one sentence where it is stated, "Of course, this 
does not apply only to Government owned property but 
also 1nay apply to any exempt property." (Ex. 7, p. 24.) 
No other directive relative to the application of Section 
59-13-73, U.C.A., was ever prepared by the State Tax 
Commission. (R. 132.) 
The trial court on the basis of this evidence found 
that there were more than 200 parcels of property 
used by individuals subject to the provisions of Sec-
tion 59-13-73, U.C.A., but that only five parcels not 
belonging to the Federal Government were taxed under 
that section. (R. 247-248.) The conclusions of the court 
are ably summarized in its oral opinion (R. 200-201): 
Well, regardless of whether it's the 14th 
Amendment or the right of the government to 
carry on its primary functions, there's no ques-
tion about it, gentlemen. Under the law as an-
nounced in W~ashington the state must uniformlY 
12 
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and wit'l1011t di~erimination enforce it~ laws. The 
roUI"t tan 't hring ibelf to the point of making a 
findng of fact in this case that because the tax 
people ot' {Ttah have only assessed the Southern 
P•u·ifi<· Railroad on an easement and the ~Texas 
Company on thrPP or four oil leases, and Thiokol, 
that this practice 'has been so acquiesced in by the 
tax pPople as to constitute discrimination in the 
leg-al spnsP. Tlwse state land contracts, gentle-
nwn, under tlw stipulation of the parties there 
are about 200 or some such number of these con-
trads that the court has examined, which if the 
court recalls correct! Y there's about that number 
wltt·n· the purchaser ·of these state lands in 1961 
pla<'Pd those lands to commercial use. rrhe court 
finds from the stipulation that this was a com-
men•ial use, but nothing was done collectively by 
thosp tax people. I'll just treat them collective}~~ 
as tax people, because the Tax Commis·sion has 
snpPrvisory duties under the Constitution and 
the assessor has, I guess, primary responsibility. 
Rut collectively in all the counties of the state 
there apparently has been a studied indifference 
over these state land contracts, and notwithstand-
in~ the fact that the Land Board is across the 
hall or another floor, somehow or other, though 
these lands are being used for grazing of animals 
and used in commercial practice, in not one in-
stance, if the court recalls the record correctly, 
has .any a~~essment been made under this privi-
lege tax. 
Xow the court is just simply impelled into 
the conclusion that so long as the state is going 
to continue to practice such discrimination, the 
least this court can do is to raise its voice in pro-
te~t and de-cide in favor of the plaintiff and find 
that the tax ha~ been discriminatorily applied and 
with reluctance direct that the money be returned 
with the interest provided by statute. * * * 
13 
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ARGU~IEXT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IN'TRODUCED AT TRIAL 
C L EARLY SUPPOR.TS THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDING ·THAT THE TAXING 
OFFICIALS OF BOX ELDER COUNTY AND 
THE STA:TE OF UTAH DISCRIMINATED 
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND 
THOSE WITH WHOM IT DEAL1T IN THEIR 
ADMINISTRA'TION OF THE U'TAH PRIVI-
LEGE T·AX, SECTION 59-13-73, U.C.A. 
The basic legal principles upon which the decision of 
this ease rests had their genesis in one of ~the early land'-
mark cases in our constitutional history. In 1819 Chief 
Justice Marshall writing for the Court in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 437, held that under our sys-
tem of dual sovereignty "the states have no power, by 
taxation or otherwise to retard, impede, burden, or in 
any manner control, the operations of the constitutional 
laws enacted by congreS's to carry into execution the 
powers ve·sted in the general government". Since its in-
ception this principle has had two aspects. First, the 
states may not levy a tax the incidence of which falls 
upon the Federal Government or its instrumentalities. 
United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); 
United States v. City of Detro~it, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); 
City of Detroit v. Mur~ay Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958). 
The second aspeet of this decision was most recently 
restated in PhiZZ.ips Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U.S. 
376, 387, which held that, "it still remains true, as it has 
from the tim·e of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 
that a state tax may not discriminate against the Govern-
n1ent or those with whom it deals." 
14 
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rrhe trial judge based hiR resolution Of the present 
,·nrttrover~v on the ~Peond aspect of this principle. He 
ntlPd tlUtt although SPetion 59-13-73, F.C.A., Appendix, 
i11lrn, wn~ not n tax on the United States, and that on its 
ra''" the ~P<'tion did not discriminate against the United 
~tatt-:-;, nev1·rtheless the officials of both Box Elder 
t 'ount ~· and the State of Utah have applied the tax with 
~m·h "~tudied indifference" (R. 200) that discrimination 
ngnin~t the Federal Government and those with whom it 
dt>alt wn~ the inescapable result. An examination 'Of the 
PvidPtwe leaves room for no other conclusion. 
A. The evidence of discrimination by the taxing 
officials of Box Elder County. 
The defendant in this suit is Le Grande Peterson, 
treasurer of Box Elder County, the taxes were asse·ssed 
hy the official~ of Box Elder County on property pos-
s~~~~d and used by Thiokol within the County. In these 
eircmnstances it is the contention of Thiokol and the 
Fnitro ~tat0s that, although the tax is imposed by state 
law, they are entitled to a refund on showing that the 
official~ of the County wielded their power in such a 
way as to discriminate against the United States ·and 
tho~" with whom it dealt. It is not essential to show, as 
wa~ in fact the case, that this discrimination existed 
throughout the State. 
~~ction 59-13-73, r.C.A., by its terms purports to 
ta.x all individuals using exempt property in business f'or 
a profit of -10 per cent of the fair market value of that 
property. Arc>epting for purposes of argument the trial 
judge'~ interpretation of the relationship betweeen Sec-
15 
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tion 39-:2-2, U.C.A., Appendix, illj'ra, .and S.ection 59-13-73, 
U.C.A., it was the duty of the county officials to apply 
Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., equally to all persons using 
either federal or state property in business for a profit.4 
In fact, although the evidence reveals that there were 
m.any parcels of property owned by the State and used 
by private persons in business for a profit within the 
jurisdiction of Box Elder County, not a single user of 
such property who was subject to the tax was assessed. 
As to the properties identified in evidence as "Brigham 
City properties" the record discloses that they were 
not taxed under any provision of the Utah l.aw. (R. 247; 
Ex. 1.) l\1or·eover, there were 34 parcels of property pur-
chased by private individuals under a contract of sale 
frmn the state title to which re1nained in the State. (Ex. 
8.) To the extent th.at these individuals were taxed at all, 
the tax was levied solely on their equity in the property; 
yet the trial court found that at least 27 of these proper-
ties were used in a business for a profit, and in all other 
respects were subject to the provisions of Section 59-13-
73, U.C.A. (R. 247-248.) 
Only one assessment was made pursuant to Section 
59-13-73, U.C.A., by the county officials for 1961; the 
assessment against Thiokol. (R. 246.) It is therefore 
not surprising that the trial judge failed to credit the 
appellant's factual contention that the County's f-ailure to 
assess state users was due to 1nere oversight. The only 
testimony to this effect cited by appellant (Br 9) is 
4. Respondents do not accept the trial court's conclusion 
(R. 250) that Section 59-13-73 U.C.A., impliedly repealed the 
inconsistent provisions of Section 59-2-2, U .C.A. See part II, 
infra. 
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with n·I'Prt'll('(l to a :-;ing-1<' pun·t-l of property, the :-;o-ealled 
"(;rav•·l Pit ~itl'." ~\:-;to tltllt. pan~el the county a:-;se:-::-:or 
had sought advi<'P from the Ctah State Ta.x Cmmuission 
a~ to it:-: taxahilit~· and had been infonned hr the Com-
mi:-::-:ion that tlH' 11:-i<' r w.a:-; taxable under Section 59-13-I:L 
( l·:x. !I.) :\ l'YPrt hPIP:-;:-;. dPs pite thi:-; correspondence the 
,L:.Ta\·t·l pit ~itt· was not taxl•tl in 19()1 and it is sole]y in 
r"lation to thi:-; failun' to a:-;se:-;:-; that Fred L. Peterson. 
tlw County AssPssor. tt·stified that there was an over-
~ight. (H. I 7!l.) The ~:~Yidence adduced at trial thus clear-
h· shows that t hP defendant and other countY officials 
. . 
di:o:('riminatPd ag·ain:-;t '1_1hiokol and the United States in 
tlu•ir complete failun· to a:-:sps·s any taxpayer other than 
Thiokol for the tax due under Section 59-13-73, U.C.A. 
In thiR situation the trial judge's finding of discrimina-
tion is ntmssailable. 
B. The evidence of discrimination by taxing 
officials throughout the state. 
In its hrief in this Court appellant seems to proceed 
upon tla~ assumption that the Fnited States is required 
to show tlmt this disc-riminatory application of the act 
prt•Yailed throughout the State (pp. -!6-58.) Since the 
dt>fendant in this easp is the treasurer of Box Elder 
Count~-. a ~tate-widP showing of di~criinination seen1s 
unnPePs:-:a ry. HowPYPr, a~ the trial judge's conclusions 
indiNt.te, the di~crimination against the l~nited States wa~ 
not (•onfined to Box Elder County but occurred through-
out tlw ~tate. The record indicates that across the 
State a~ a wholl' then· were 380 vendees of land under 
enntraet of sale from the ~tate and of these approxi-
matPly :200 wer~:~ subject to ta..x lmder Section 59-13-73, 
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U.C.A. IIowever, not one of these individuals found 
subject to the tax was assessed under Section 59-13-73, 
U.C.A. (R. 247-248.) 5 'To the extent that any of the 380 
vendees were taxed at all it was upon their equity only 
under Bection 59-2-2, F.C.A. In addition, a series of 
special use leases was introduced into evidence. Five of 
these, all apparently utilities subject to the assessment 
jurisdiction of the Utah State Tax Commission rather 
than the county assessors, were taxed in accordance, with 
Seetion 5·9-13-73, U.C.A. (R. 138.) These five use leases 
constitute the only evidence that any users of state prop'" 
erty were assessed under Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., in 
1961. 
The United States made careful inquiry at the trial 
to ascertain what steps had been taken by the Utah State 
Tax Commission to inform the loeal assessors under the 
Commission's supervision of the privilege t:ax and advise 
the·m as to its implementation. The state witnesses in-
dicated that the only action taken in this respect was 
at the 1959 Assessors School at which the, new tax was 
discussed. (R. 105.) The entire discussion at that time 
centered on the constitutionality and revenue potential of 
applying the tax wgainst persons using United States 
property. Only one sentence of that discussion intimated 
5. Appellant has suggested for the first time in its brief 
in this Court that the assessor of Kane County taxed some prop-
erty within that county in accordance with Section 59-13-73, 
U.C.A. (Br. 46.) This i,s contrary to the stipulation of facts 
(Ex. 1), and the court's findings ( R. 24 7-248), and concerns 
a fact as to which respondents have no knowledge and have never 
had the opportunity to challenge, by cross-examination or other-
wise. It is certainly not a proper subject of judicial notice and 
respondents strenuously object to any consideration of the 
matter in this suit. 
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that thP appiicability of thP tax Pxknded beyond users 
ot' t't•tlPra.l property and included n~Pr~ of all fonns of 
(1'\l'lllpt propPI1y. (l~~X. 7, p. ~-t) 
Other than the procPedings at the above-mentioned 
:·whool, no other ~ tPp~ appear to have been taken by the 
Utah ~tatP Tax Comn1ission. The Commission has con-
tinm•d to certify equity values of vendees of state land 
eontract:-; and no directives appear to have been issued 
indieating to the recipients of these equity lists that they 
might be useful in discovering property subject to the 
privilege tax. (R.. 107, Ex. 8.) It thus appears that there 
i~ ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding 
that. the di~criminator~· aetions of state taxing officials 
ag-n.inst Thiokol and the United States occurred on a 
~tate-wide basis. 
It. i:-; tn1e that ~fax H. Kerr, Director of Property 
Tax for tlw Utah State T·ax Commission, testified that 
it wa~ the Commission's policy to tax all exempt prop-
erty alikC', and that the only reason that property suh-
jeet to the tax would escape assessment would be attri-
butable to the lactk of discovery. (R. 98-101.) However, 
~[r. Kerr also testified that the Commission has author-
ity to a~~P:'s any property not assessed by the county 
nsst-:'~nr~. but admitted this authority had never been 
(IX(\rri~Pd under Section 59-13-73, U.C.A. (R. 108.) Sec-
tion ;)~l-5--!6, r.C.A., chronicles the many and varied 
ftmctions of the l ~ tah State Tax Commission and clearly 
indirates the large measure of responsibility vested in 
that body to control, adYise and supplement the work 
of the ro1mty assessors. For example, Mr. Kerr testified 
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that the Couunission continually 1nakes investigations 
to detennine the existence of property that has Pscaped 
taxation, although he could not recall a singl(l instance 
where property was uncovered and added to the tax 
rolls under :--icetion 59-13-73, P.C.A., (R. 111.) In these 
circumstances the trial judge seems clearly correct in 
failing to find as a fact that the state-wide f'ailure to 
assess could be attributable to oversight. Under (ltah 
law the failure to find a fact as urged by one of the par-
ties is within the peroga:tive of the fact finder and the 
trial judge's factual deter1ninations will not be over-
ruled. De Vas v. X oble, 13 U.2d 133. The appellant has 
failed to show any error in the trial court's refusal to 
accept "oversight" as an explanation. 
C. The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 
the trial court's finding. 
In addition to suggestion that the trial court erred 
in failing to find that the discriminatory application of 
the tax was due to oversight, appellant has suggested 
that there is insufficient evidenc;e of discrimination itself. 
(Br. -!7.) This ch'allenge by appellant see1ns to be predic-
ated on two different grounds. First, it is argued (Br. 
48) that even though Section 59-13-73 U.C . .A. purports 
to apply to all property, both real and personal, Thiokol 
1nay only rely on evidence of a discriminatory treatment 
of per~onal property. Second, it is argued (Br. 52-55) 
that in order to prove unconstitutional discrimination, 
Thiokol and the United States 1nust prove a specific 
intent to discriminate and the evidence, of this intent 
was insufficient. 
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.\ ppl·llant'=-- fi 1·=--t ut·gmnent dearly ig·1wn'=-' the la.n-
~·Ul~P of tlu~ :-;tatntP itself. It is predicated on the propo-
:o:ition that tl11• HtntP Legislature might havP pa~~(·d a dif-
t't•rt~nt ~tatute, one t•ovPring personal property only, 
n.nd thnt =--twh n :-;ta.tute if it had been Pnacted 1night have 
h··•·n applit~d in a non-di~eriminatory 1nanner. However, 
this nr~"ltment rannot detract fro1n the fact that the 
~t1ltute as }Hl~=-'Pd applied equally to persons using real 
o1· pPr~onnl propert~r in a business for profit. The 
~tntutP hy it~ terms covered many people subject to the 
tax in addition to rfhiokol, yet 'U.S applied by the county 
only rrhiokol was a~~Pssed and as applied on a. state-wide 
ha~i~. only a handful of utilities were assessed. (R. 246-
~.f!).) The overwhelming 1najority of people subject to 
:-\pl'tion ;l!)-13-7:3 F.C.A. P:o:eaped that section's 1nandate 
('Olllp}etp}y. 
The only ea:-:p eited b~· appellant (Br. 48) in support 
of it=-- argument i~ f.'sso Sta.ndard Oilv. E·tJ.aus, 345 U.S . 
.f!)+: however, an exruuination of that case reveals that 
it i~ coneerned with a totally different situation. In 
that (·a=--e E~~o was storing gasoline owned by tl1e United 
~tate~ in tanks owned or leased by Esso and was held 
sub,iect to the Tennessee tax on the total gallonage so 
~tored. An earlier rrennessee case had exempted a state 
ag'{'nry from this tax on the basis that the storage tanks 
were lt~a:'Pd hy the state agency. The Supren1e Court 
h(\ld that a di:'tinction in treatment based on whether 
theo :'torage tanks were in the possession of a private 
party or the Government was a reasonable c.lassification 
and refused to as~ume that the state would have denied 
nn exPmption to the rnited States if the Vnited States 
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had leased the storage tan:ks rather than Esso. Thus in 
Ess.a the United States was posing the hypothetical possi-
bility that rrennessee would not have followed its earlier 
precedent even if the United States had leased the stor-
age tanks. This case is certainly not an authority which 
permits appellants to argue that a differently worded 
statute in this case might have been applied in a non-
discriminatory manner. If an;nthing, Es,so Standa.rd Oil 
v. Evans, supra, supports the respondent's position that 
we .are concerned with the actual statute and its aciual 
application. In this case it is clear that the statute as 
actually drawn subj~ected a large number of persons 
to its tax, but as .actually applied only the users of federal 
property were assessed in Box Elder County, and when 
viewed on a ·state-wide basis only a handful of utilities 
were inc1uded within the section's ambit. (R. 246-249.) 
Appellant's second challenge (Br. 52-55) to the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial judge's find-
ing of discriminatory intent is equally without merit. 
In the first inst~ance appellant has proceeded on the 
assumption that the legal s~tandard upon which the trial 
judge must weigh the evidence is the same standard 
used in the "equal-protection claus·e" eases. On the basis 
of that assumption appellant then argues that the evi-
dence was insufficient. Both the assumption upon which 
the appellant has proceeded .and the conclusion it reached 
on the basis of this assumption are incorrect. 
Appellant's claim that the sufficiency of the evidence 
must be rneasured against the sarne legal standard as the 
Suprerne Court of the United States has used in the 
equal-protection clause cases is incorrect as a matter 
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111' law. .\.s the ~nprPmP Court of the United States 
,h•t·lan·<l most recentlv in Phi!l ips Co. r. Dumas School 
/Jist., :~li 1 F.~. 37(), :~S;) "It is true that perfection is by 
11 11 mPanH requirP<l under the equal protection test of 
pt'nnissible elassification. But we have made it clear, 
in the t>q ua l protection <'a~e~, that our decisions in that 
fip\,l are not ne<·P~~arily controlling where problems 
of intergovPrntnental tax immunity are involved." 
·To the ~anw effect wa~ l\1:r. Justice Jackson's state-
ment in Uuif<'d States L Allegheny County, 322 U.S.174, 
191: 
The questions in this case do not arise under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. They depend on pro--
visions adopt·ed and principles settled long before 
the Fourteenth Amendment and which exist in-
dependently of it. 
Th.iokor s clain1 is predicated on supremacy clause 
principles announced some fifty years befove the Four-
tPenth .\1nendment was even adopted. The right asserted 
hy Thiokol and the Fnited States in this case is founded 
exeln~ively upon the Federal Government's right to oper-
ate without discriinination directed against it or those 
with whom it deals. \\ifien evidence is adduced at trial 
that a ta.x ha~ been applied in such a way as to affect the 
rnited States differently than those equally affected 
under the statutory terms, such application cannot be 
sustained. ~-\s long as such unequal treatment has any 
praetical impart on the United States or those 'vith whom 
it deals, the application of that law is unconstitutional. 
lou·a.-Des .1/oines Bank r. Bennett, 28-! lT.S. 239. 
The /ou·a-Des .. llaines Bank case, supra, presents 
an exceHPnt example of the distinction between the equal 
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protection clause te:::;t of discrhnination mul the t<·:.;t ap-
plied when the in1n1unity of the l~nited State~ is involved. 
That ca~e involved the consolidated claim of both a 
national and a ~tate bank, that they were di~eriminated 
against by being taxed at a higher rate on their ~tcwk 
than sirnilar rnonied corporations. The ~tate ('ourt a:-;. 
surned the discrimination ,as charged, but held that it wa:-; 
attributable to the illegal action of the eounty auditor and 
that no cause of action existed. The Supreme Court of 
the rnited States reversed; however, it treated the 
rights of the national bank differently from the rights 
of the state bank. A:-; to the national bank, the Court 
held that it wa~ an in~trumentality of the Federal (;ov-
ernrnent, taxable onl:· by the consent of t!te F·ederal Uov-
ernment, and stated "The limits of tlli:-: permission (to 
tax) w·ere tran::-~gre~::-~ed when the tre,asurer Px.aeted 
fron1 this petitioner taxes at rate:-: greater than thmw 
applied in exacting pay1nent from the competing domestie 
corporations." (P. 244.) There was no :-;ugge:-tion that an~· 
intent~ional or systernatic discri1nination \\·a~ required. 
It was only when Justice Brandeis reached the part of 
the opinion (p. :2-!3) labeled "Second," which coneernPd 
the elain1 of the state bank under the equal protection 
clause, that the clairn of intentional and :-:·:-:t(•uwti<' cli:-;. 
crimination he('anw important. Thn:-; it is clear that ap-
pellant':-: challenge to thP sufficiency of the evidence in 
the in:-;tant case, based a:-; it i~ on the equal protection 
:-;1anclard, is predicated on a incorrect articulation of the 
tP:-;t against which the evidence adduced at trial i:-; to 
ht> judged. The evidenee clearly reYeab that. rPgarcll!'~~ 
of what rnay have been the intent of the legislature in 
pa8:-:ing ~Petion 59-13-73, F.C.~-\ .. it has been aclministerf'd 
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with :-:twh an utwvt-n hand that a \'t-ry rPa.l di~('riminatory 
impn(•t a.u:ain~t the lTnited NtatP~ has re~ulted. The col-
lt·d ion or the tax in thf'~(' <·i rcuinstances was tlwrefore 
in violation of the Con~titution of the United States and 
the trial judge wa~ eorred in granting judgnwnt to Thio-
kolnnd tlw [nitPd Ntate~ in the refund action. 
llowPVPr, even if we assume, for purposes of argu-
nwnt. that the proper test of discri1nination in this case 
i:-: tlw ~ame a~ that applied in the equal protection clause 
~·a:-;"~. tht- United States has met its burden of proof. 
l t :-:t•Pm:-; dear frOin the trial judge's oral opinion, find-
ing-~ and conclusions of law (R. 195-202, :2-t-5-251), there 
was ~uh~tantial evid_ence to meet the equal protection 
:-:tnndard. l 1 nder Ftah law the burden of course res.ts 
upon the appellant to show wherein such findings are 
nnsupportPd h~· the evidence. In L01re v. Rosenlof, 12 U. 
~\1190, lD:!, it wa~ stated: 
This court has stated on numerous oceasions 
that findings of fact made by the trial court will 
not be disturbed so long as they are supported by 
substantial evidence. Therefore, the findings of 
the lower court 1nust be affirmed unless there 
wa~ no reasonable basis in the evidence on which 
the court could fairly and rationally have thought 
the requisite proof was met. 
Appellant's argument (Br. 5:2) in this respect 1nerely 
:-;ug·g-,•:.-t~ that the failure to assess the gre81t bulk of prop-
erty attributable to Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., was due 
either to a mistake as to the facts or a mistake as to 
the law. 4-\~ we noted earlier, the trial judge did not 
aeeept the appellant's factual theory that this failure was 
attributable to a mere oversight. This was the eourt's 
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prerogative as fa0t finder. De ras v. Noble, Sllpra. In 
addition appellant seems to suggest that the evidence 
is insufficient because no one testified that they intended 
to discriminate against the United States. (Br. 55-56.) 
This latter argument seems predicated on the ground 
that in order to have discrimination in the terms of the 
equal protection test the taxing officials mus,t have some 
specific intent to diseriminate- in other words, an evil 
motive. This is not the law. It is true that the equal 
protection test requires an intentional or systematic 
discrimination between persons similarly situated. But 
the intention required is merely a general intent. Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356; Sioux City Bridge v. Da-
kota County, 260 U.S. 441; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board, 
284 U.S. 23; Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620. 
The complete f·ailure of the cnunty officials to assess an~' 
persons subject to the tax and their similar failure to 
even trouble to make an investigation to determine the 
existence of such persons provides overwhelming sup-
port for the trial court's characterization of their ac-
tions as involving a "studied indifference" (R. 200); the 
apparent parallel lack of action that occurred through-
out the state is equally conclusive in this regard. 
It is quite clear that both the county officials and 
the State Tax Commission knew, ·or should have known, 
that there '''ere a great number of state-owned properties 
that were used by persons subject to the privilege tax. 
The very fact tlra t there were 380 properties in the hands 
of private individuals under contract of sale from the 
State should have made this clear. (Ex. 8.) Certainly ap-
pellants could not have believed that not one of these 
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propertiP:-i w.u:-; U:-it>d in business for a profit, yet no effort 
was made to dete11nine which of these properties were 
:-iUbjt-et to thP tax. If the appellants purposely failed to 
a:-il'·('rtnin whieh properties were subject to the tax be-
enll:-iP tlwy did not believe Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., 
applied to state-owned lands, the tax w.as unconstitution-
nlly Pxaded. In ~ueh a case, the "intent" require1nent of 
thP eQual protPdion test is satisfied by showing that the 
defendant~ intended not to tax state property; the fact 
that tltPy did not have a c·onscious purpose to discrimi-
nah', or that their failure was based on a mistake of law, 
i~ i rrdev.ant. On the other hand, if they bel~ieve Section 
;l~l-13-73, F.C.A., was applicable to those among the 380 
who used the property in business for a profit, and were 
llll'l'Ply indifferent to the discrimination which must 
follow their failure to investigate or assess such prop-
t•rty, the intention test is equally satisfied. In such a 
ca~e the "intent" element is supplied by the studied 
indifference of the taxing officials in the face of a re-
sult that they knew, or should have known, was certain 
to follow. 
Accordingly, although the United States does not 
eoncede that the equal protection test of discrimination 
i~ applicable to this case, even when the evidence is 
measured against that standard, it is clear that there 
wa~ ample eYidence to support the trial court's finding 
that (R. ~50): 
The taxes paid under protest were discrimin-
atorily assessed and levied in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States and the S.tate 
of l~tah, and were therefore illegal and void. 
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D. The trial court was correct in ordering a 
refund of the full amount of the tax which 
was illegally collected. 
In its brief (Br. 56) the appellant has contend(:'d 
in the .alternative that if the evidence is sufficient to sus-
tain ·the trial judge'•s findings, the relief accorded was 
nevertheless improper. Appellant contends that the trial 
court should have created its own tax by determining "the 
percentage value that the assessn1ent to Thi'Okol bore to 
the average percentage assess1nent to the non-assessed 
property and granted a reduction, if any, in the excess 
mnount and judgment only for that amount." (Br. GS.) 
The suggestion of appellants bears a striking re-
semb~ance ·to the contention rejected by the Supreme 
Court in .Jl oses Lake 1-1 antes v. Gr{]jnt County, 365 U.S. 
7 -1-±. In that case Grant County attempted to tax the 
full value of buildings and improvmnents on privately-
owned 'V"herry Act leaseholds of housing developments 
on a federally-owned Air Force base, although it taxed 
other leaseholds, including privately-owned leaseholds 
of tax-exe1npt state lands, at a lower valuation. The Court 
of Appeals had directed that the tax be reduced to what it 
would have been if the tax had been levied on a non-
Wherry Aet leashold basis. In reversing tllis direction, 
the Sup:r:en1e Court silnply stated "\Vhen, as here, the tax 
is invalid, it '1nay not be exacted.' Phillips Co. r. Dumas 
Scho·ol District, 361 U.S., at 387." (365 r.S. 7-14, 752). 
In this 0ase the taxing officials of Box Elder County 
enforced Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., against Thiokol for its 
mw of rnited States property but failed to enforce that 
tax against any other taxpayers subject to the tax. 
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..\ppt-llant ~ugg-('~t:-; that if the Court finds this action 
un 1·on~t itutional t Itt> Court may then proceed to fashion 
l\ difft-rt>nt tax wllieh will lw constitutional. Appellant 
:'PPIII~ to ignon' thP fact that tht>n• is no legislative au-
thorization for :-;ueh behavior and that its suggestion 
would in t>t't't><·t rP<luire this Court to draft a totally new 
:-;tntntP and then decree its application.6 
.\ ppeHant argm-'s that it is essential for this Court 
tn fashion such a remedy because otherwise Thio!kol 
would be put "in a better position than others and all he 
is entitled to is to be placed in a generally equal position." 
(Hr. ;l7.) T·his argument is simply not in accord with 
thP fads. The legislature in 1959 passed a privilege tax. 
The taxing officials failed to .apply 1this tax to anyone 
htt t Thiokol. Thiokol j :-; therefore entitled to the same 
tr~ntment that everyone else received: not to he taxed 
und~r ~Petion 59-13-73 U.C.A . 
. \ ppellant appears to have once again been misled 
hy the equal protection cases. In those ca;ses the situation 
:-;om~tinws ari8es that the valuation of the complaining 
partip:-;' property is greatly in excess of the valuation 
placed on similar property of others. In such a situa-
6. In addition, the formula that appellant would have this 
Court apply has a doubtful constitutional basis and the United 
States does not concede that it would be valid. It appears to ag-
gregate all the properties subject to the tax and then apply an 
average rate of tax to Thiokol. However, some of these proper-
ties were not taxed at all. Some were taxed on the equity interest 
only and the amount of tax would thus vary from property to 
property according to the particular contracts and the rate of 
payment. Any rate derived from such a scheme appears entirely 
too whimsical, arbitrary and incapable of ascertainment to serve 
.1s a basis for taxing users of property owned by the United 
States. 
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tion the obvious remedy is to reduce the plaintiff's valua-
tion to those and of all others silnilarly situated. The 
situation here is quite different. We, a:ve not confronted 
with a discriminatory exercise of power under a statute 
with regard to the amount of the assessment; rather, we 
are confronted with a failure to apply the statute at 
all. Accordingly, the appropriate remedy is not to apply 
Section 59-13-i73, U.C.A., :to Thiokol. 
II 
THE 'TAX IMPOSED ON USERS OF STATE 
PROPERTY BY SECTION 59-2-2, U.C.A., 
WHEN COMPARED WITH THE TAX IM-
POSED ON USE·RS OF FEDERAL PROP-
ERTY BY SECTION 59-13-73, U. C .A., 
WORKS AN UNCONBTITUTTONAL DIS-
CRIMINATION AGAINST THE UNITED 
BTATES. 
Section 59-2-2, U.C.A., is one of the exemption pro-
visions contained in the Utah tax code. In effect this 
section limits the tax liability of contract purchasers and 
lessees of state land to the value of their equitie·s in the 
land and any improvements. Sections 59-5-50, and 59-5-
51, U.C.A., seem specifically designed to facilitate the 
administration of the tax in relation to state-owned prop-
erties b~, providing thaJt the State Land Board is to sub-
mit a list of properties sold by the State to the State Tax 
Oom1nis,sion, which is in turned required to inform the 
local asses,sors of any such properties. Nothing in Sec-
tion 59-2-2, P.C.A., provides for any difference in tax 
treatment when the 'Contract purchasers or lessees use the 
state property in business for a profit. 
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On the other hand, ~Petion 59-13-73, t:".C . .A., pur-
pot·ts to tnx persons using tax-exempt property in busi-
n•·~~ for a profit on thP full value of such property. It 
is appnn·nt that unless Section 59-13-73, U.C.A., has 
~uperl:'ede(l or repealed the limitation on the tax imposed 
hy SPd ion :-l!l-:2-~, U.C.A., to the e~tent that purchas·ed 
:->tatt- propPtty is used in business for a profit, Seetion 
.-l~l-13-7:~, lT.C.A., is unconstitutional. Phillips Co. v. Du-
mas Sd~aol IJist ., 361 U.S. 376; JJI oses Lake Homes v. 
Urant rolln(lt, 365 lT.S. 74-t This much the appellants 
have conceded. In their brief it is stated (p. 39) : 
Indeed, were any different construction given 
~the statute a difference in tax as·seS'sment valua-
tion would exist he-tween lessees and beneficial 
possessors of federal lands and those of state 
lands. This would obviously render the Privilege 
Tax discriminatory and hence unconstitutional. 
ln order to avoid the unconstitutional discrimination 
inherent in the two sections, the trial court held that Sec-
tion j~l-13-7:~. U.C.A., impliedly repealed Section 59-2-2, 
l".C .. A., to the extent that the latter section purports to 
limit the tax on persons using state property in busi-
ne:-;:-; for a profit. (R. 250.) In support of this ruling 
appellants rely on the princple7 that (Br. 41)-
if there are two possible constructions of a statute, 
one of which will render •the statute constitutional 
' and the other unconstitutional or render the con-
~titutionality doubtful, the interpretation will be 
adopted which will save the statute. 
----
7. Appellants also suggest (Br. 45) that Section 59-13-77 ~.C.A .• express]y repeals any inconsistent portion of Sectio~ 
<l9-2-2, U.C.A.; however, nothing in the language of that section 
suggests any form of repeal was intended. 
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I-Iowever, appellants also recognize (Br. 43) that an ap-
plication of the above canon of construction to the faet:-; 
of this case creates a conflict ·with the equally persuasive 
principle that the law does not favor repeal h~· implira-
tion. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed.), Hr<'-
tion 2014. 
In this respect this Court has stated in Union Pac. 
R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 103 U. 186, 196: 
It is elementary that statutes may be repealed 
by implication, and where the provisions of a later 
statute are clearly and manifestly repugnant to 
the provisions of existing statutes the latter are 
deemed repealed to the extent of such repugnancy. 
Such repeals, however, are not favored, and if two 
apparently conflicting acts can be reasonrubly con-
strued so as to reconcile and give an effect to each, 
such construction should be adopted. 
That the statutes in question can be construed \rith-
out repugnancy is amply illustrated by the actions of 
the taxing officials in this case. These officials, whose 
administrative actions in construing the statutes are 
entitled to great weight (E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 109 U. 563, 578), simply applied Section 
59-13-73, U.C.A., to users of federal properties and 
Se·ction 59-2-2, U.C.A., to users of state property. The 
difficulty is not that the legislature has enacted two 
statutes that are 1~epugnant in their ·operation, rather, 
the proble1n sten1s from the f.aet that the two statutes, 
when construed in harmony with one another, violate 
the United States Constitution. Phillips Co. t:. Dumas 
School D·ist., supra; 1lloses Lake Homes v. Grant County, 
supra. 
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111 
PROPERLY COXSTRUI~~D, SECTION 59-13-
~~ r.C.A., IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIO-
KOL'S USE OF THE GOVERN~IENT'S 
PROPJ1~H.'£Y IX PERFOR.JIAN,CE OF THE 
H.ESEARCII AND DEYELOP~IENT CON-
TRACT BE'T\VEEN THEM; AND, IF CON-
STRU}JD TO APPLY TO SUCH USE, SEC-
'PION flD-13-73 U.C.A., VIOLA:TES THE CON-
~TITUTIONAL IMJ\IUNITY OF T H E 
r~l'rED STATES FROM STATE TAXA-
TIO~ BECAUSE LAID UPON A USE SOLE-
LY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE UNITED 
~TATES. 
rnder the terms of the research and development 
l'Ontra('lt hd\n'<'n Thiokol and the United States (Ex. 6) 
Thiokol's compensation \\·as fixed at the outset of the 
l'ontraet. Unlt-ss there was a change in the work to be 
performed, Thiokol's fee would re1nain unchanged re-
gardlt·~s of the actual cos'ts that are incurred (R. 77) 
and this predetermined compensation could not be in-
l'reased hy the extent or 1nanner in which Thiokol used 
the Government property in its possession (R. 74). Since 
Thiokol l'ould not derive any pecuniary benefit from 
it~ n~P of thjs property, it does not constitute the "posses-
~ion or other beneficial use" which is taxed by Section 
.)~l-13-73, r.C.A. :Moreover, if it be deemed to be the use 
contemplated by the statute, the tax is here actually 
hPing levied on the Government's beneficial use of its 
own property in the conduct of Government business. 
Thiokol is not selling the first stage of a missile to 
the Fnited States. It is selling only its research and 
development services in connection with the production of 
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a missile and this missile is owned by the United States 
in every phase of its production. Thiokol's fee for iti' 
research and development services is finnly fixed and 
it cannot be taxed on the Governn1ent-ovmed propPrty 
used in performing the services since it has no taxable 
interest in such property. That any such tax is a ta.x 
on the United States is well illustrated by an example 
given in the District Court's decision in United States v. 
Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9, 23 (E.D.S.C.), affirmed per 
cuf'liam, 364 U.S. 281: 
The custodian of a f·ederal post office build-
ing is paid for the performance of his duties, but 
his use of the materials he requires in the per-
formance of his housekeeping duties is so com-
pletely that of the United States that no one 
would think of taxing him upon the value of the 
materials. 
This result prainly does not turn on a distinction between 
individual and corporate employment. A local express 
company hired at a monthly fee to manage and operate 
a post office on behalf of the United States could not 
be taxed on the use of the post office if all profit from the 
post office operations would belong to the United States. 
In this case the tax is one upon the United States (al-
though it purports to be upon a Government contractor 
and is collected from the contractor) because it is a tax 
on the beneficial use of the prop·e:rly; and the United 
States reaps all ~the benefits fr01n the use of the prop-
erty it owns. 
The unconstitutionality of the tax imposed by Sec-
tion 59-13-73, U.C.A., as applied to this case is high-
lighted b~- a comparison of the pres·ent case with the 
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~Lichigan "u:o~P" tax ('.ase~ decided in 1957. United States 
, .. City of Ddroit, 355 U.S. 466; United St.ates v. Town.-
."'hip of .l/u .... -kctJon, ~55 l:.s. 484. (A companion case, City 
of J)t'f roil r. ~.l/ wrray Corp., 355 U.S. 489, did not involve 
n "u:o~p" tax.) In the ~lichigan cases, the Supreme Court 
h•·hl Umt a :-~taU• may impose upon an independent con-
tnwtoi' a use ta..x measured by a value of tax-exempt prop-
erty ust•d in the business of manufacturing products lwter 
to be sold in one case to third parties and in the other 
to thP United States. In each case, a private party used 
Uovl'I1lment property to manufactur·e goods which it 
then :-;old for its own profit. Its profit from the sale of 
it:-; product was the result of application not only of its 
own work but also of the property it used. In short, the 
contrador enjoyed the benefits of the use of Governm·ent-
owned property. Therefore, the private contractor cd'Uld 
be taxPd upon the privilege of using the capital assets 
owned by the United States. Here, in contrast, the fee 
n•et>in"'d hy Thiokol is in no part .attributable to the Gov-
ernment-owned property used in the performance of its 
I'P:->t'a.rch and development contract. The payments are 
simply and entirely for Thiokol's services; it cannot 
profit by any increase or decrese in production because 
nf the efficiency or inefficiency of the Government-
0\\'lled equipment; it uses this equipment because it is 
needed in the research .and de:velopment and not because 
it profits from the product tllis property helps to pro-
duce. ~\ny benefits from the use of the Government-
owned property belong to the United S.tates and any tax 
on the benefits of using this Government property is a 
ta.x upon the rnited States, which alone enjoys the bene-
fits of its use. 
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In the ~lichigan cases, the Supreme Court recognized 
the distinction we are now urging, and reserved for a 
future case the question here presented. In United States 
v. Township of 111.uskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486-487, the Su-
preme Oourt emphasized that Continental, which used 
Government property in the performance of supply con-
tracts with the Government, "was free within broad 
limits to use the property as it thought advantageous and 
convenient in perforn1ing its contracts and maximizing 
its profits from the·m." The Supreme Court noted that 
Continental was "acting as a private enterprise selling 
goods to the United 8ta;te·s. In a certain loose way it 
might be c.alled an 'instrumentality' of the Fnited 
States, but no more so than any other private parties 
supplying goods for its own gain to the Government." It 
stated (355 U.S., P. 486) : "The case might well be dif-
ferent if the Government had reserved such control over 
the activities and financial gain of Continental that it 
could properly be called a 'servant' of the United States 
in agency terms." In thus reserving the question, how-
ever, we do not believe that the Supreme Court intended 
to make immunity depend upon whether the private party 
was an "independent contractor" rather than a servant, 
as that distinction has dev:eloped in the law concerning a 
master's liability for the torts of a servant. Rather, we 
suggest that the Supreme Court used the phrase " 'serv-
ant' of the United States" as a shorthand phrase to de-
scribe the private party which was paid to perform serv-
ices for the Government as distinguished from one who 
was "free * * * to use the property as it thought advan-
tageous and convenient in performing its contracts and 
maximizing its profits from them." 
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Thl' qtw~tion left open .in the )lichigan cases and here 
pn·;o;t·nted-whether a state may tax a private party's use 
of (i ovPrnmen t property in the course of rendering serv-
ii'P:-1 for the l'nited States where the private party never 
owm•<l or enjoyt•d the product o.f its services, but was 
nwrPly paid a fep for its time and efforts-was decided 
in favor of constitutional immunity in Livingston v. 
Fnitt'd Htalt· .... ·, 36-! U.S. 281, affirming, per curiam, 179 
F. Supp. ~l (E.D.S.C.) 8 
Tharl; case involved a management contract with the 
.\tomic Energy Commission (A.E.G.). Under this con-
traet, the du Pont Company had agreed to construct and 
operaJte .\.E.C. plants and facilities located in South 
Carolina for the exclusive benefit of the United States . 
. \ll the products produced or process·ed were at all times 
owned by the United States, as were all o.f ·the equipment, 
materials and supplies used in connection with such pro-
duction. South Carolina's Tax Commission asserted that 
duPont wa.~ liable for the paym·ent of sales or use taxes 
upon the property it used on behalf of the United State'S. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of a three-
judge District Court which had held that in these cir-
cwnstancPs the South Carolina tax was a tax upon the 
rnitPd State~, and not upon duPont. 
It is true that in the Ltvingston case duPont received 
no fee for its services and here Thiokol received a sub-
8. It is true that the reasoning of the Livingston C3Jse, 
tllpra., seems to have been rejected in United States v. Boyd, 
363 S.W. 193 (Tenn. 1962), as appellants have indicated. (Br. 
16-17.) The Boyd case is now on appeal to the Supreme Court. 
(Docket No. 185, October Term 1963.) 
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stantial fee. But that distinction is imrnaterial, since the 
fee received in rthe present case did not depend in any 
way upon how successfully Thiokol utilized the Govern-
ment's property. Thiokol could not use the Government's 
property in this case in any way whi0h would result in its 
"maximizing its prof~ts from them." Towllship of Mus-
kegon, s~tpra. Indeed, the District Court in the LiV?'ug-
ston case did not ground its decision on the absence of 
reward for duPont's services, a matrter about which there 
was some dispute. Irt held that, even if du Pont was 
viewed as having received substantial consideration for 
its services, it could not be taxed on the use of Govern-
ment-owned property where, as here, the consideration 
received by Thiokol was not related in any way to the 
value or the tax-exemprt status of the property used. 
The court the:r:e said, "In a sense, of course, du Pont 
may be said to have the use of aU the materials and 
facilities at ~the S1avannah River Plant, but in the same 
sense it may be said that the individual members of the 
AEC have the use of all of the f·acilities entrusted to their 
care." 179 F. Supp., p. 23. We submit that here, too, 
while Thiokol may be s:aid to have had the use and 
possession of the Government's equipment, this use and 
possession we:r:e no different from that which individual 
employees of the A.E.C. or pos~t office have of the facili-
ties entrusted to their care. Accordingly, if SeCJtion 59-
13-73, U.C.A., which requires "possession or other bene-
ficial use" is applied to this case despirte the facl that 
Thiokol cannot derive any pecuniary benefit from the 
use of Governm·ent property, such an application is un-
constitutional because Thiokol has no taxable interest in 
the property. 
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CO~CLUSION 
'rhe judgment of the trial court is correct insofar 
a~ it lwld that SPdion 59-13-73 U.C.A. had been applied 
in ~ueh n m.anner as to diseriminate against the United 
Stuh·~ and those with whmn it dealt. The trial court 
erred in failing to declare that ( 1) the lesser tax imposed 
on u:wr~ of ~tatP land under Section 59-2-2 U.C.A. ren-
dl'l'4't l the higher tax imposed on users of federal prop-
Prty under Section 59-13-73 U.C.A. unconstitutional, (2) 
Thiokol had no interest in the property which Section 
59-13-7:~ purports to or could constitutionally tax. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS F. OBERDORFER 
Assistant Attorney General 
LEE A. JACKSON 
I. HENRY KU'T'Z 
WIDLTAM MASS.AR 
Attorneys 
Department of Justice 
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APPENDIX 
6 Utah Code Annotated (1953) : 
SEC. 59-2-2. State lands - hnprorcmeJifs 
taxable. - No tax shall be levied upon lands, the 
title to which remains in the state, held or oren-
pied by any person under a contract of sale or 
lease from the state, but this provision shall not 
be cons,trued to prevent the tax'ation of improve-
ments on such lands and an interest therein to the 
extent of money paid, or due, in part payment of 
the purchase price thereof, whether an e~tension . 
df payment has be~en granted or not prior to the 
levy of such tax. Where final payment has been 
made upon such lands, the contract ~of sales shall, 
for the purpose of taxation, be regarded as pass-
ing title to the purchaser or assignee, and the 
state land board shall immediately certify the 
receipt of such final payment to the state tax 
commission. 
* * * * 
6 Utah Code Annotated (1953, 1963 Pocket Supp) : 
SEC. 59-13-73. Privilege tax upon possession 
and use of tax-exempt property.- Exceptions.-
From and after the ·elffective date of this act there 
is imposed ~and there shall be collected a tax upon 
the posseBsion or other beneficial use enjoyed by 
any private individual, association, or corporation 
of any property, real or personal, whi'Ch for an~· 
r-eason is exempt from taxation, when such prop-
er-ty is used in connection with a business conduct-
ed for profit, except where the use is by way of 
a concession in or relative to the use of a public 
airport. park, fair ground, or similar property 
which is available as a matter right to the use of 
the general public, or where the possessor or user 
is a religious, educational or charitaJble organiza-
tion or the proceeds af such use or possession in-
40 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
urt- to the lu.•rwfit of ~twit religion~, educational 
or charitah!P organization and not to the benefit 
of any other individual association or corporation. 
~ o tax shall be imposed upon the possession or 
other beneficial use of public lands occupied un-
der the tPnns of mineral or grazing leases or per-
mits isstlPd by the United States or the State of 
tT tah or upon any easement unless the lease, per-
mil or easement entitles the lessee or permittee 
to rxrlusive possession of the premises to which 
the lease, permi~t or easement relates. 
(Amended 1959.) 
HEC. 59-13-74. Rate of t,ax same as ad valor-
fill property tax - Credit against t,ax on use of 
fedcrally-ou·ncd property. - The tax imposed 
upon such possession or other beneficial use of 
tax-exen1pt property shall be in the same amount 
and to the same extent as the ad valorem property 
ta.~ would be if the possessor or user were the 
owner the roof; provided that there shall be cred-
i tPd against the tax so imposed upon the bene-
firial use of property owned by the federal gov-
Prnment the amount of .any payments which are 
made in lieu of taxes. 
(Amended 1959.) 
~EC. 59-13-77. Exemptions granted in other 
sections not limi-ted or repealed. - Nothing con-
tained herein shall he construed as limiting or 
repealing the exemptions granted in sec.tions 59-
2--t 59-:2-5, 59-2-6, 59-2-7' 59-2-8, 59-2-9 59-2-12 
and 59-2-13 Utah Code Annotated 1953. ' 
(An1ended 1959.) 
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